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INJURIES CAUSED BY WORK-RELATED STRESS ARE NOT COGNIZABLE UNDER THE 
JONES ACT 
William C. Skye v. Maersk L ine, L imited Corporation 
751 F .3d 1262 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
(Decided May 15, 2014) 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that excessive work hours and erratic sleep schedule 
resulting in physical injury to a seaman in the form of left ventricular hypertrophy was not 
cognizable under the Jones Act. 
William Skye filed suit against his employer, Maersk Line, Limited Corporation ("Maersk"), to 
recover money damages for negligence for an injury stemming from excessive work hours and erratic 
sleep schedule. 1 The action was brought under the Jones Act, 46 U . S.C. § 30104, which provides a 
cause of action in negligence for a "seaman personally injured in the course of employment. "2 Skye 
worked as chief mate for over eight years on The Sea/and Pride, which was operated by Maersk.3 
Skye's job duties required him to work overtime, which adversely affected his health due to fatigue, 
stress, and lack of sleep.4 In 2008, Skye was diagnosed with left ventricular hypertrophy, a thickening 
of the heart wall of the left ventricle, which his cardiologist attributed to hypertension. 5 Skye' s  
cardiologist concluded that the "continued physical stress related to [Skye' s] job, with long hours and 
lack of sleep" caused his hypertension, which, in turn, caused his left ventricular hypertrophy. 6 
The district court instructed the jury to decide whether Skye' s  injury and its causes were 
physical or emotional .7 The jury returned a verdict finding that Skye sustained a physical injury.8 The 
district court entered judgment in favor of Skye after the jury verdict in his favor.9 The jury awarded 
Skye $2,362,299.00 in damages, which the district court reduced to $590,574.75 to account for Skye' s  
comparative negligence. 10  Maersk moved for summary judgment o n  the grounds that Skye could not 
recover for an injury caused by work-related stress and, alternatively, that the statute of limitations 
barred his claim. 1 1  The district court denied the motion.12 Maersk appealed the decision of the district 
court.13 
On appeal, the E leventh Circuit vacated the district court ' s  judgment and held that Skye' s  claim 
was not cognizable under the Jones Act. 1 4 The Federal Employers' L iability Act, and by extension, the 
1 Skye v. Maersk Line, Ltd. Corp. , 751 F.3d 1262, 1263 ( I  I th Cir. 20 14). 
2 /d. See also 46 U .S.C. § 30 I 04. The Jones Act provides a cause of action in negligence for "a seaman" personally injured 
"in the course of employment," in the same way that the Federal Employers Liability Act provides a cause of action in 
negligence for injured railroad employees against their employers. 45 U.S.C. §51 et seq. 
3 !d. at 1263. 
4 !d. 
5 /d. at 1264. 
6 !d. 
7 !d. at 1265. 
8 /d. at 1265. 
9 !d. at 1262. 
1 0 /d. at 1263. See also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gotshall, 512 U.S. 532, 532 ( 199 4). The Supreme Court held that 
plaintiffs could not recover for work-related stress under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 
11/d.at l264. 
1 2 /d. 
1 3 /d. at 1262. 
14 !d. at 1267. 
5 
Jones Act, are "aimed at ensuring ' the security of the person from physical invasions or menaces . '  "1 5 
For employers to be liable, the employees' injuries must be "caused by the negligent conduct of their 
employers that threatens them imminently with physical impact. "1 6  Therefore, because work-related 
stress is not a "physical peril ,"  the Jones Act does not allow Skye to recover for injuries caused by 
work-related stress . 1 7 
The facts of this case paral leled the facts in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gotshall, where the 
Supreme Court held that injuries caused by the long-term effects of work-related stress are not 
cognizable under the Federal Employers' Liabil ity Act because they are not caused by any physical 
impact or fear from the threat of physical impact. 1 8  The Supreme Court adopted the zone-of-danger 
test for injuries not caused by a physical impact-"a worker within the zone of danger of physical 
impact will be able to recover for emotional injury caused by fear of physical injury to himself, 
whereas a worker outside the zone wil l  not ."  1 9  Therefore, the Court would allow recovery for damages 
for injuries sustained as a result of his employer' s negl igence only if the injuries were suffered while 
within the zone of danger of a physical impact.20 Here, Skye alleged that he "was injured while aboard 
the vesse l"  because "reduced manning and other conditions caused excessive duties and duty time ."2 1  
Skye also complained that Maersk was negligent when it "fai led to provide him with reasonable 
working hours," adequate personnel ,  time, equipment, and rest hours, and overworked him "to the 
point of fatigue. "22 However, Skye was diagnosed with left ventricular hypertrophy, an injury which 
gradual ly developed over a period of time.23 No physical impact occurred, and, therefore, no zone of 
danger existed. Accordingly, Skye's injury does not fal l  within the zone of danger. 
The Eleventh Circuit also held that the central focus of the Federal Employers Liabil ity Act and 
the Jones Act is "on physical perils . "2 4 "An arduous work schedule and an irregular sleep schedule are 
not physical peri ls . "25 The cause of Skye' s  injury was work-related stress; it is inconsequential that 
Skye developed a "physical injury. "26 A physical injury is not enough.27 And, according to the 
Supreme Court, awarding Skye for his injury would potentially lead to " 'a flood of trivial suits, the 
possibil ity of fraudulent claims . . .  and the specter of unlimited and unpredictable l iability '  because 
there is no way to predict what effect a stressful work environment -compared to a physical accident 
[ . . .  ]-would have on any given employee. "28 
Accordingly, Skye' s  complaint is not cognizable under the Jones Act. The Eleventh C ircuit 
reversed the district court 's  decision and rendered judgment in favor of Maersk. 
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15 /d. at 1265. See Consolidated Rail Corp. , 512 U.S. at 555-56. (quoting Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. , 773 F.2d 807, 
8 13 (ih Cir. 1985)). 
1 6 /d. See Consolidated Rail Corp., 5 12 U.S. at 555-56. 
17 /d. at 1265- 1266. 
18 /d. at 1266. See Consolidated Rail Corp. , 512 U.S. at 558. 
1 9 /d. See Consolidated Rail Corp. , 512 U.S. at 556. 
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